. The translation aims at clarity and faithfulness to the original rather than elegance; in general all translations are my own unless otherwise indicated. The Commentary is mainly concerned with issues of medical and scientific method; questions of textual criticism are discussed only insofar as they bear on the interpretation of the author's argument. For each chapter the Commentary contains an introductory note that begins with a summary of the chapter's contents, as well as specific notes keyed to particular passages in the text by lemmas in both Greek and English. These lemmatic comments are chiefly intended to offer supporting evidence for the claims made in the introductory notes; I have, however, tried to provide enough cross references so that the reader can use them as a guide to particular passages. The Commentary aims at completeness in the citation and presentation of evidence, especially on questions of terminology. This is justified by the radical claims that have sometimes been made on the basis of the author's use of certain terms; I hope that it will also make the work of value to future writers of commentaries on other Hippocratic texts. The Introduction offers an account of the argument of VM as a whole, attempts to place the work in its intellectual context, and addresses the general issues of its date, reception, and authorship; it naturally draws heavily on the analyses presented in the individual Commentary chapters. Finally, the two Appendices explore some of Man (1998) ; the reader will find many references to these works throughout. In the summer of 2000 I had the privilege of reading a then forthcoming study of VM by John Cooper, which has since appeared under the title 'Method and science in On Ancient Medicine ' (2002) . This paper has been most valuable to me in revising the dissertation, both by confirming my views on certain issues and prompting me to rethink some others; I am in fundamental agreement with it on many key points of interpretation, though of course not on all. Finally, there is hardly a page that does not reflect the beneficial influence of Jacques Jouanna's edition, which has been the basis of all my work on VM; I hope the book proves to be a worthy companion to it.
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ABBREVIATIONS AND EDITIONS
The abbreviations used throughout are those of H.G. Liddell, R. Scott, and H.S. Jones, A Greek-English Lexicon (henceforth 'LSJ'). For works not included in LSJ, titles and abbreviations are as given by the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae Canon of Greek Authors and Works (3rd ed., Oxford 1990) and the Oxford Classical Dictionary (3rd ed. rev., Oxford 2003). References to sources included in H. Diels and W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (6th ed., Berlin 1952) are given using the abbreviation 'DK'. References to VM are to the section, page, and line numbers of Jouanna's text, followed by 'J.'. In quoting and referring to other Hippocratic works I have made use of both the Budé (Paris: Les Belles Lettres) and Corpus Medicorum Graecorum (CMG) series. The following editions (each of which is listed in the bibliography) have been used for individual works:
INTRODUCTION
The Hippocratic treatise On Ancient Medicine (VM) is a key text in the history of early Greek thought.
1 The author of VM attacks a group of thinkers who attempted to systematize medicine by reducing it to the interaction of one or more of the opposites hot, cold, wet, and dry, factors which had played an important role in much of early Greek natural philosophy. The opponents attacked in VM claimed that all diseases were caused by one or more of these four factors, which the author calls π σεις (hypotheses), and that medical practice was a matter of determining the cause of a disease and prescribing its opposite as the cure. The author responded that medicine had no need of a π εσις such as hot, cold, wet and dry. It was already a well established τ νη, an ancient and genuine art, consisting of a body of discoveries that had been made over a long period of time by following a methodical procedure. VM is the first evidence in the history of Greek medicine of a sustained reaction against the attempt to base medical practice on theories drawn from natural philosophy. Moreover it is also the first attempt in the history of Greek thought to give a detailed account of the development of a science from a starting point in observation and experience. The dispute between the author and his opponents thus raises issues that involve more than just medical method, issues of broad significance for the history of scientific method in general.
Because it raises issues of such wide significance for the history of medicine and the history of science, VM has probably been the focus of more specialized studies than any other Hippocratic work. However, such studies have tended to adopt one or more of the following three approaches, each of which is based on questionable methodological assumptions.
First, ever since the work of Émile Littré in the nineteenth century, VM has figured prominently in attempts to answer what has tradition-2 introduction ally been known as the 'Hippocratic question': the question which of the works in the Hippocratic Corpus was written by Hippocrates himself. Littré was a strong advocate of the view that VM was a genuine work of Hippocrates, and it accordingly stands at the head of his ten-volume edition of 1839-1861. In 1911 Gomperz offered a vigorous defense of Littré's view; on the other hand, Pohlenz, Capelle, and Festugière all argued vehemently against the Littré-Gomperz position.
2
Attempts to identify the historical Hippocrates as the author of certain works or the source of certain views sometimes give the impression of being no more than a search for those Hippocratic works or views that the scholar in question finds admirable: whatever was good about Greek medicine, it is assumed, must have been inspired by the great Hippocrates. In any case it is doubtful whether it will ever be possible to offer a convincing reconstruction of the doctrines of the historical Hippocrates on the basis of the extant evidence, which amounts to a brief account in the Anonymous Londinensis papyrus, a few scattered references in Plato and Aristotle, and the famous passage in Plato's Phaedrus (269e-272b) in which Socrates makes a lengthy comparison between correct method in rhetoric and the recommendations of 'Hippocrates and right reason' about correct method in medicine. There are, then, grounds for radical scepticism about the possibility of answering the Hippocratic question as traditionally posed.
3 Any study of VM motivated primarily by the desire to answer the traditional Hippocratic question is likely to reach conclusions that are dubious at best.
A second characteristic of many scholarly studies of VM is a preoccupation with the question of influence, whether of philosophy on medicine or the reverse. A prime exponent of this approach is Hans Diller, who after explicitly setting aside the traditional Hippocratic question at the beginning of his 1952 article 'Hippokratische Medizin und Attische Philosophie' goes on to cite Werner Jaeger's Diokles von Karystos (1938) as a paradigm of method. Just as Jaeger tried to prove that Diocles was dependent on Aristotle for his theory of method and much else, so Diller attempted to show that the author of VM was dependent on Plato for the most fundamental features of his intellectual outlook.
4 Although Diller's thesis was never widely accepted, the tendency to view VM and other medical writings as derivative of philosophy has been remarkably persistent. Ludwig Edelstein, too, advocated the view that Greek medical writers simply took over doctrines wholesale from the philosophers. As far as VM is concerned, Edelstein argued that the author was a representative of 'Hippocratic empiricism', a methodological stance characterized by the rejection of all generalizations and resulting from the influence of Protagorean relativism on medical thought. 5 Others have attempted to trace influence in the opposite direction, from medicine to philosophy: thus James Longrigg has argued that VM influenced Protagoras, rather than the other way around.
6 A common weakness of all these interpretations is the assumption that intellectual affinity implies intellectual influence, as though it were impossible for two thinkers to adopt similar positions on similar questions without one of them being familiar with the work of the other. Moreover, affinity of language has often been confused with affinity of thought. For example, arguments for Protagorean influence on VM or the reverse rely largely on the author's use of the term μ τρ ν in chapter 9. But a close examination of the passage reveals that the author's position cannot be characterized as relativist in any philosophically meaningful sense of the term (cf. p. 48 below). To be convincing, a claim of intellectual influence must be based on affinities of thought, not just language, and affinities that cannot plausibly be explained in any other way. Whether any of the affinities between VM and other thinkers are best explained in terms of influence remains to be seen; but such a conclusion must be based on a thorough analysis of the author's thought on its own terms, one that does not begin from the presumption that influence is there to be found.
Finally, determining the identity of the theorists attacked in VM has sometimes taken precedence over the study of the author's own position. Thus G.E.R. Lloyd in his 1963 article 'Who is attacked in On Ancient Medicine?' argues that VM is attacking the Pythagorean Philolaus or medical theorists strongly influenced by him.
7 Such an approach involves some of the same pitfalls as the traditional Hippocratic quesMethode, Hypothese hat, und darüber hinaus sein methodisches Bewußtsein als solches sind ohne Platon nicht denkbar.' 5 Edelstein 1967a, 195-203; cf. Kühn 1956 , 26-27. 6 Longrigg 1963 1983. 7 Lloyd 1963 (reprinted with new intro. in Lloyd 1991, 49-69) . Similarly, Vegetti 1998 argues that Empedocles is the direct and specific target of the author's attack. 4 introduction tion. Given the vast amount of early medical literature that has not survived, it would be quite remarkable if we could pinpoint the specific thinker or work attacked by a Hippocratic author in a particular passage, even if we could be sure that the author in question had a specific target in mind. Nor is this approach free of a preoccupation with influence and a reliance on verbal similarities that do not imply genuine intellectual affinities. For example, Lloyd lays great weight on the point that the author of VM uses the term π εσις in the sense 'assumption', a use that has no exact parallel in fifth-century sources. Because a number of passages in Plato suggest that the term was used in this sense by fifth-century mathematicians (cf. Meno 86e-87b, R. 510b-511e), Lloyd proposes that the author of VM (or his opponents) may have been influenced by the use of π σεις in mathematics.
8 But there is no reason to think that the use of π εσις to mean 'assumption' originated in a single specialized context and then spread to other disciplines; moreover the use of π σεις attacked in VM in fact bears very little resemblance to the term's specialized mathematical uses, insofar as these can be determined from the extant evidence. 9 The identity of the author's opponents is an intriguing and problematic question, but it should not be allowed to take precedence over the study of his own position.
What is needed in order to make progress on the questions that have dominated earlier studies of VM is a sustained examination of the author's argument, free of presuppositions about his identity and intellectual affiliations. In section 1 below I attempt to set out the background of the argument by clarifying both the areas of common ground between the author and his opponents, and the points on which they differ. Section 2 gives a brief account of the argument itself, drawing heavily on the analyses presented in the Commentary. In section 3 I turn to the questions of VM's audience, intellectual context, and date, and the closely related issues of reception and authorship.
8 Lloyd 1991, 51-53. 9 See the Commentary on ch. 1, esp. 1.1 π εσιν … π μεν ι τ λ γ ω (pp. 120-126). In approaching the argument of VM it is crucial to recognize that despite the vehemence of the author's attack on his opponents, he and they actually share a good deal of common ground. In particular, they share a conception of τ νη (art, craft, or science) as a set of procedures organized in a highly systematic fashion and based on knowledge of the nature or σις of its subject matter. In the case of medicine, τ νη requires knowledge of the nature ( σις) of the human body and the causes (α τ αι) of health and disease. This conception of τ νη was adopted by Plato and Aristotle and came under intense scrutiny in the debate between the Rationalist and Empiricist doctors of the Hellenistic period.
10 But the evidence suggests that it first emerged within medicine itself, for a number of reasons.
That the author and his opponents share this conception of τ -νη emerges clearly from chapters 1-2 and 20-21, where the contrast between their positions comes into sharp focus. The opponents attacked in chapter 1 conceive of medicine as a highly systematic body of procedures based on knowledge of the cause of disease. The author criticizes them for 'narrowing down the primary cause of diseases and death for human beings' to one or two principles ( π σεις) such as hot, cold, wet, and dry; their view is that medical practice requires determining the cause of a disease and prescribing its opposite, on the assumption that opposites are the cure for opposites (cf. 13.1). The author represents the opponents as attempting to set medicine on a new foundation ( π εσις) in order to give it the systematic character it needs to qualify as a genuine τ νη. His response is that medicine is already a solidly established τ νη: practitioners differ in competence from one another, which would not be the case if nothing had been discovered in medicine and the affairs of the sick were governed by chance (τ η) (1.2). Practitioners have an ability that allows them to bring about certain outcomes in a reliable fashion; the implication is that this involves the knowledge of causal connections. In chapter 2 the author responds to the opponents' attempt to introduce π σεις into medicine not by denying that medicine needs a systematic foun-6 introduction 1.1 dation, but by claiming that it already has one: a principle ( ρ ) and a method ( δ ς) that have made it possible to make great discoveries over a long period of time (2.1). Chapter 20 turns to a group of opponents who claim that medical practice must be based on a certain kind of knowledge of human nature ( σις): according to them, in order to treat patients correctly the doctor needs to know how human beings were originally formed from a small set of elementary constituents like the four elements of Empedocles. For these opponents, such theories were the basis of highly systematic accounts of the causes and cures of disease. The author rejects this kind of knowledge of human σις as irrelevant to medical practice, but then goes on to set out a view of what the good doctor does need to know about human σις in order to practice medicine. The doctor must know what the human being is in relation to foods, drinks, and other practices, i.e. what specific effect each of these factors will have on the human being (20.3). It is not enough just to know that cheese is harmful: the doctor must know exactly what harm it causes and why (δι τ 147.3 J.). Chapter 21 goes on to explain that this knowledge is crucial to avoiding serious mistakes in treatment. Elsewhere the author frequently stresses the need for the doctor to have knowledge of causes (cf. 2.2, 11.1, 14.2, 23.1); a substantial part of the text is devoted to arguing that hot and cold are relatively unimportant as causes of disease (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) . Throughout the text the author is concerned with both knowledge of human nature ( σις) in general and knowledge of the nature or constitution ( σις) of the individual patient. The concept of σις plays a key role in the account of the discovery of medicine in chapters 3-8, an account which culminates in a general theory of human σις (14.4) that provides the kind of explanatory knowledge demanded of the doctor in chapter 20.
For both the author and his opponents, then, medicine is a τ νη because it is based on general, explanatory knowledge of human σις. To understand why this conception of τ νη arose in medical circles, we need to consider the opposition between τ νη and τ η, chance or luck, which was common in Greek thought from the fifth century BC on. In chapter 1 of VM τ νη is opposed to τ η and associated with the notion of discovery: if medicine were not a τ νη and nothing had been discovered in it, practitioners would all be equally incompetent and the affairs of the sick would be governed by chance (τ η) (1.2). In chapter 12 the author insists that medicine is a τ νη that has been discovered by following a systematic method; its discovery was the result of reasoning (λ γισμ ς), not chance (τ η) (12.2). τ νη, then, results
